What does a closer Europe mean?

The meeting mainly strengthened the institutions and mechanisms for the coordination and integration of the European Union. Therefore, we pro-Europeans give it a positive assessment. And we are hopeful in two respects: that the measures agreed will really reduce current pressure on the euro and the European economies, and that the process of integration will continue. It will must, or else we will relapse.

We concluded last week with the following question: What repercussion will this have for Catalonia?

Let me go back some years to the mid eighties, when Catalonia was bold enough to play a leading role in the ARE (Assembly of European Regions, a movement that defended an idea of Europe (and more precisely of the EU) with two basic components. The first, a strong European Commission and Parliament, namely, its basic constitutive bodies. The second, strong regions within the states (regions or, in some cases, nations without states). The ideological framework of this approach was the principle of subsidiarity, the idea being that what can be done on a specific level need not be taken to a higher level. In other words, higher levels should not appropriate the responsibilities and powers of lower levels. On the other hand, this very principle underscored the need to delegate at the highest level – that is, the EU Commission and the EU Parliament — the competencies and instruments necessary to fulfil the process of European unification, especially with regard to fiscal policy, finance and market discipline.

Furthermore, the ARE sought to promulgate respect for and recognition of all the linguistic and cultural particularities within Europe by both EU and state institutions.

Though respectful in its approach towards the states – which continued to be a fundamental part of political and social organisation -, the ARE envisaged more power for European institutions and greater recognition and more scope for action by the regions. The states would remain the centrepiece of political organisation, yet they would no longer hold absolute power, which had been the case until then. This would be in the interests of Europe and of the regions (or stateless nations).

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We worked along these two lines for some years. The regionalist movement spread to Europe, and there were processes of regionalisation and of autonomous organisation. Catalonia played a leading role in this. We exercised leadership.

No wonder that sooner or later – sooner rather than later – there would be backlash from the states against this movement. We will spare the details as to what happened, but we were not strong enough to resist. Today the ARE continues its activity and performs positive work, but without the drive it had up to the nineties. The states on the one hand have checked regionalism (and the action of the nations without states), and they have to some extent tried to become stronger with respect to Europe. However, they have finally had to yield sovereignty to Europe. So, one of the ARE’s two objectives has been achieved: the institutional consolidation of Europe, though not the objective of the regions (or the nations without states) to acquire more political power. What’s more, the states will probably seek to compensate for the reduction in power imposed from the top by recovering the competencies and, in general, the powers that had been ceded to the lower levels. This has already happened in Spain: no sooner had the Spanish government ceded the powers of political, economic and social decision-making to Brussels than it tightened its control and pressure on the autonomous regions. And there are even suggestions of a possible or probable recentralisation policy.

And in all likelihood Brussels will intervene little, or not at all, on behalf of the autonomies. So – from Catalonia’s perspective - the situation arising in Europe may well be disadvantageous for us, and the defence of our self-government– and of Catalonia as a country – will have to be largely conducted by Catalonia herself with her political and social resources. Hence, we have no choice than to bolster Catalonia’s internal cohesion and her collective will of affirmation. No direct action from Europe will save us from fiscal plundering. However, the fact that European political and social practice is by and large less inept than the Spanish might come in handy in our fight. For example, that in Germany the fiscal deficit of a Land may not be more than 4% is an important point of reference when it comes to discussing ours, which is above 8%. Or even the high standards of many European countries’ – though not all – constitutional courts underpins our condemnation of the confusion and disrepute of many Spanish centralist institutions. So the good news of a closer Europe is not more autonomy. But despite this it is good news as it beefs up European political and cultural values. And this suits us. Because the spirit and the outlook of Europe form a great deal of our identity.

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There is one more aspect relating to Europe that will make many Catalans reflect and rejoice. And even more so now the Spanish intentions of leaving us on the sidelines have become evident.

From this standpoint, what does a closer Europe mean?

Although EU policy is not to encourage the independence of a new state, when it happens – as it quickly did with Slovakia, more slowly in Macedonia’s case and slower still in Montenegro or Kosovo- the EU incorporated – or will incorporate — these new states. In the case of the Czech Republic’s declaration of independence from Slovakia, which took place without any hostility towards the Czech Republic, the European Union greeted it with suspicion. At first it tried to prevent it. But it was eventually accepted and Slovakia was incorporated into Europe, as Montenegro and Macedonia will be sooner or later. And as Croatia is about to be.

This leads to three observations. First, today independence processes are the result of internal matters within existing states. They are processes that eventually produce social majorities. This held true for Czechoslovakia, as it did for Serbia, in the case of Montenegro. These Independence processes were not foreseen in the early nineties. Clearly this would also hold true for Spain and Catalonia.

Second, the concrete and immediate problems that Catalonia currently has with Spain will not be resolved via Brussels or Strasburg. I repeat immediate and concrete. For example, that Spain should meet its budgetary or competence commitments. Or that it should not limit the use of Catalan. These are problems that need to be discussed with Spain. And their resolution will depend in large part on Catalonia’s cohesion and power.

Third, this does not imply that Catalonia should not continue looking to Europe. Because, as we have mentioned, the spirit and outlook of Europe forms part of our identity.

The conclusion is the one we all know: what ultimately counts, and will count, is Catalonia’s inner strength. And the level of Spanish coherence, of course, and to some extent Europe’s position. But above all it is our inner strength. It’s all extremely difficult, but not impossible. And whatever the outcome, what is needed is a spiritually strong country, with a spirit for initiative in all areas, a determination to defend its identity, and cohesion and a willingness to integrate.

And a Europeanness characteristic of our roots and our outlook.